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DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1960
CASE COMMENT
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
- ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
The defendant was convicted of violating a city ordinance'
which prohibited the distribution of any handbill that did not indi-
cate on its face the name and address of the author and identity of
the individual sponsoring its distribution. The purpose of the hand-
bill was to urge a boycott against certain merchants who would not
offer equal employment opportunities to persons of various races,
and to solicit membership in a consumer organization to fight this
evil. The defendant urged that the ordinance violated his free-
dom of speech and press. The Superior Court of Los Angeles af-
firmed the conviction 2 and the United States Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari. 3 The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was un-
constitutional as an abridgment of freedom of speech and press se-
cured against state invasion by the fourteenth amendment. Talley
v. California, 80 Sup. Ct. 536 (1960).
Freedom to communicate for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 It is commonplace
that the printed or spoken word may not be the subject of prior
restraint or subsequent punishment unless it creates a substantial
manifested or anticipated evil that the state has power to prevent. 5
The policy toward restrictive "handbill" legislation" has been
set forth in numerous Supreme Court decisions. An ordinance for-
bidding any distribution of circulars, handbills or literature of any
kind within a city limit without the permission of the city manager
is an unlawful abridgment of freedom of the press.7 So also are
ordinances which forbid, without exception, any distribution of
handbills on the streets,8 even where this distribution involves a
trespass upon private property in a company-owned town9 or in a
government-owned housing development.10 Religious sects may not
be obstructed under a broad statute from exercising the privilege of
1 Los Angeles, Calif. Municipal Code § 28.06 (1932), which reads: "No person shall distribute any
handbill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or face
thereof, the name and address of the following: (a) the person who printed, wrote, compiled or
manufactured the same, (b) the person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however,
that in the case of a fictitious p.rson or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true names and
addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsorina said handbill shell also apear
thereon." See Denver, Colorado. Revised Municipal Code '1 352.13 (1951) (Distribution of Handbills).
2 332 P.2d 447 (Cal. App. 19581.
3 360 U.S. 928 (1959).
4 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (The First amend-
ment is secured against state infringement by the fourteenth). See also Corwin, The Constitution and
What it Means Today, 252 (11th ed. 1954).
5 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (compelling interest of the state). But see Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (emphasis placed upon serious danger); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941). Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (opinion by Holmes, J.).
6 The "Handbill" cases, infra notes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. See also the list of preferred position cases
identified by Frankfurter in his opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336' U.S. 77 (1949).
7 Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. (1943); Schneider v. Irvington,.'308 U:S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
8 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
9 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
10 Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
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door-to-door distribution" or solicitation,12  though door-to-door
peddling and distribution of purely commercial advertising matter
could be lawfully restrained.'3 In Schneider v. Irvington,14 efforts
were made to distinguish four broad restrictive ordinances from
those previously struck down, on the grounds of prevention of
frauds, disorder and littering within the city limits. 5 In refusing
to uphold the' ordnances, the Court pointed out that there were
other means available to accomplish these aims without abridging
personal freedom of communication. 6
The broad ordinance in the instant case falls squarely within
the ban of the previous "handbill" cases and is declared void be-
cause of unlimited restriction of distribution. 17 The ordinance did
not restrict what could be said, who could say it, or where it could
be said. The only condition to free distribution of the matter was
the identity of the publisher and distributor which created the pos-
sibility that someone might hesitate to publish if he must identify
himself with his own statements.
The Court had before it, in resolving the familiar problem of
individual freedom versus state police power," the question of
whether the freedom to communicate also contains the freedom to
communicate anonymously.
The Supreme Court has at least three times considered the
"right to remain anonymous."' 9 While the Court has mentioned
the guaranty of freedom of speech in the course of its opinions, the
decisions have rested primarily upon the constitutional right of free-
dom of association..0 the anonymity in these cases pertaining to
privacy within a group. The earliest case, Bryant v. Zimmerman, '
upheld a New York statute which required secret organizations
such as the Ku Klux Klan to file membership rosters with the
state.2 2 Two more recent decisions, NAACP v. Alabama23 and Bates
v. City of Little Rock 24 (both completely opposite from Zimmer-
man) held that a state may not compel members of a lawful group
engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified. The
Court reasoned that identification and fear of reprisal might deter
perfectly peaceful discussions of public importance. 25
11 Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
12 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
13 Beard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
14 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
15 Schneider v. Irvington, 38 U.S. 147 (1939) (ordinances from Milwaukee, Wisc.; Worchester,
Mass.; Los Anqeles, Calif. and Irvington, N.J. were tried together on the basis of unlimited restriction
of distribution).
16 Schneider v. Irvington, supra note 14 at 162.
17 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
1S Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945) (the court recognized the frequency with which
this problem arises and the delicacy of its solution).
19 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 80 Sup. Ct. 412 (1960) (disclosure of membership lists would
interefere with members' freedom of speech and association); NAACP v. Alamoba, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (NAACP not required to divulge membership); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954) rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (statute compelling the
Communist party to submit membership lists . . . clear and present danger); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953) (concurrinq opinion, lists of puurchosers should not be required to be divulged);
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (statute requirinq disclosure of membership lists valid).
20 American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (opinion suggested identification
as members of a grouup could have coercive effects on constitutional rights).
21 Bryant v. Zmmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); State Control Over Political Organization, 66 Yale
L.J. 545 (1957).
22 The Court construed that the statute exempted labor unions and benevolent associations as
beneficial, but the potentialities of evil secret societies to render harm brought them necessarily
within state control.
'3 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
24 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 80 Sup. Ct. 412 (1960).
25 Bates v. City of Little Rock, supra note 24 at 416. See also DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) (the government remains responsible to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected).
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The distinguishing feature of this group of cases appears to be
that the degree of privilege is contingent upon the nature of the
group, the Ku Klux Klan being more of a threat to peaceful societal
existence than the other group.- '
Justice Black, a known crusader of human liberty,'2 7 in writing
the majority opinion in the instant case, decided that the right of
anonymous communication exists, but he has not limited the extent
of that right. Surely the Court does not propose to announce a new
absolute, namely, that even those groups which have no freedom
to speak, or those types of speech which are not privileged can now
be uttered anonymously. Since all justices agree, despite the first
amendment, that freedom of speech is not absolute, the question be-
comes one of deciding what and when speech is not protected by the
amendments.-' There is no clear cut rule to determine this nor
should there be any mechanical device to dispense justice in such
cases. 29  Viewed in the light of past decisions, the court must be
merely clarifying that which has been in existence since the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights-where one is free to speak he is also free
to speak anonymously.:' The effect of the instant holding will re-
main to be seen in future cases where government regulated com-
munication arises."
Dissenting Justice Clark, joined by two others,'2 sought to limit
the "handbill" doctrine to its present bounds by assertng that the
Constitution says nothing about freedom of anonymous speech. Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court itself has upheld an act of Congress re-
quiring any newspaper using second class mail to publish the names
of the editor, owner and stockholders.:' It has upheld the Federal
Lobbying Act"14 requiring those engaged in direct lobbying activities
to divulge their identities. Statutes in a majority of states prohibit
the distribution of anonymous publications that refer to political
candidates." Similarly, the Supreme Court has held constitutional
city ordinances which prohibit the distribution of leaflets and door-
to-door canvassing for purely commercial purposes, the use of sound
trucks being operated on the city streets using instruments to emit
26 Judge Swain, Los Angeles Superior Court, concurring in the instant case: "The distinction between
the two seems to be that the members of the NAACP are good guys and the members of the Ku Klux
Klan are wicked men," 332 P.2d at 452 (Cal. App. 1958). See clso United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 at 57 (1953) the Court did not consider the constitutional question but the concurring opinion, and
said, "Once the government can demand of a publisher the names of the purchasers of his publica-
tions, the free press as we know it disappears."
27 Justices Black and Douglas, and perhaps Chief Justice Warren, 'are known as the libertarian
element of the Supreme Court, Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment, 196 (1957).
28 Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 392 (1950).
29 The line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which will be legitimately
regulated, suppressed and punished is finely drawn, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Corwin,
Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 Notre Dame Low. 325 (1952) (the status of the danger
rule is subject to doubt). American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ("clear and
present danger" is not a mechanical test in every case touching the first amendment).
30 Anonymous writings are for from uncommon in American tradition. See Bleyer, Main Currents
in the History of American Journalism 56-57, 79-82, 102 (1927).
31 See generally Mehler, Constitutional Free Speech v. State Police Power, 33 DICTA 145 (1956).
32 Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker join dissenting. Justice Frankfuruter is part of the well-known
liberalist element of the Supreme Court, Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment 197 (1957).
33 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
34 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1952); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (but the statute is
narrowly construed).
35 Thirty-six states have statutes prohibiting anonymous distribution of materials relating to
elections; see Colo. Rev. Star. 1 49-21-39 (1957), which states, "Whoever willfully publishes or
distributes any card, pamphlet, circular, poster, dodger, advertisement or other writing relating to or
concerning any person who has publically declared his intention to seek election . . . which does not
contain the names of the persons, associations Ietc. I ... responsible for the publication or distribution
of the same . . . shall . . . be fined . . . (no Colorado decisions). See also Kan. G. S. § 25-1714
(1949), held constitutional in State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936).
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"loud and raucous noises, '36 and publications containing fraudulent,
deceitful, libelous words that cause injury.3 7 Ordinances prohibit-
ing obscene statements38 and false advertising" also have been sus-
tained. It was said that Talley's handbill designed to injure a busi-
nessman was no more comportable with the first amendment than
these. The city was merely acting in the public welfare.
The cases cited on both sides can clearly be distinguished. Each
of the "handbill" cases involved a broad ordinance proscribing dis-
tribution of all handbills or leaflets, not limiting the matter to
that of a commercial or possibly injurious content. The restriction
by broad sweep also silenced individuals or groups seeking to fur-
ther an idea by distribution of material solely devoted to informa-
tion or public protest."
Those cases which upheld seemingly more restrictive ordi-
nances than in the Talley case, dealt with specific legislation with-
in the power of the state to control. The legislation was pointed at
a particular type of communication leaving little doubt of the evil
or prospective evil sought to be prevented.4 1 Clearly, the Talley
case should not be included with this group unless those dissenting
are ready to acknowledge that all speech is to be state regulated.
The purpose of the ordinance provision in the instant case is
fairly obvious; it was to make it easy for the city or any individual
injured by a publication to place the blame on a particular individ-
ual.42 It is suggested that the prohibition of Talley's anonymous
publication in no way restricts his freedom of expression, but mere-
ly imposes on the advocate the responsibility necessarily associated
with a well-ordered society,43 the theory being that we should have
nothing to hide from one another. 44
This view overlooks or disregards the long history behind the
basic constitutional freedoms45-the fact that free discussion of the
problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism 46 and
that the validity of our civil and political institutions depends upon
such discussion. Accordingly, a function of free speech and free
press under our system of government is to invite dispute. "Its
highest purposes are sometimes served when a condition of unrest
creates a dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or even stirs
people to anger. '47 It was this sort of speech that the Bill of Rights
was designed to protect. Those utterances of a purely orthodox na-
ture need no protection.
With this in mind, justification for the "right to remain anony-
mous" becomes apparent. Few would rigorously assert beliefs if
36 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
37 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Jersey, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
38 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
39 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (a state may regulate commercial advertising in
the public interest).
40 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41 United States v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the regulation measure must be
narrowly drawn to meet the evil that the government can control.
42 People v. Talley, 332 P.2d 447, 453 (Cal. App. 1958).
43 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), 291 ("Ordered Liberty," Jackson, J. dissenting);
State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936).
44 We still believe in a secret ballot; some of the most worthwhile literature in American history
was written under a pen name. Bleyer, Main Currents in the History of American Journalism, 56-57,
79-82, 102 (1927).
45 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 813-23 (1931). See generally Douglas, We the Judges 307-28
(1956); See also S Encyc. Soc. Sci. 455-59.
46 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
47 Termuriello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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life and lives of family members would be endangered thereby, or if
ill will and hostility of the community would be the inevitable re-
sult.
48
It may be urged that if the individual is not required to reveal
himself when he speaks and does not accept the responsbility for
what he says, the community will not be able to protect itself from
injurious frauds, libels and obscenity that would result.49 The aims
of the Los Angeles ordinance may have indeed been worthy ones,
but the fact that the liberties may be abused by a miscreant few
does not make any less the necessity of immunity of the individual
from previous restraint.0 It must be remembered that the Bill of
Rights was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that
too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement
of the law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free
society should not be sacrificed.
Richard W. Laugesen.
BAR BRIEFS
REPORT OF LEGAL FEE REVIEW COMMITTEE
TO THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Gentlemen:
The Colorado Bar Association, at its 1959 annual meeting, auth-
orized the creation of a Legal Fee Review Committee, to serve the
public, clients and attorneys, in the adjustment of controversies
concerning legal fees, without resort to the costly, protracted and
drastic remedies previously available. That Committee has been
organized recently and is now in functioning order.
The services of the Committee are available to all clients of all
lawyers actively engaged in practice in Colorado, whether members
of the Association or not and to the lawyers themselves.
The Committee is composed of one member of the Colorado Bar
Association from each judicial district in Colorado appointed by the
President of the Association. To insure continuity, one-third of the
Committee serves for one year, one-third for two years, and one-
third for three years. It meets as determined by the Committee or
upon call of the Chairman, who is appointed for a period of one
year by the President of the Association.
The Committee functions in the following manner. A complaint
in a controversy over legal fees is filed by either the client or the
attorney with the Colorado Bar Association. The Secretary immedi-
ately notifies both parties that the matter will be held in abeyance
for 30 days to allow the parties an opportunity to settle their differ-
ences. Upon notice by either party that the controversy has not
been settled within the 30-day period, it is then referred to the Com-
48 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); People v. Talley, 332 P.2d 447, 453 (Cal. App.
1958) (dissenting opinion).
49 The state contended that the ordinance was aimed at prevention of "fraud, deceit, false adver.
tising, negligent use of words, obscenity and libel," 80 Sup. Ct. 536, 539 (1960).
50 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931).
